We address the interrelationships between residential mobility, labor market mobility, and commuting. The paper takes its starting point in recent findings in economic research which emphasise that job and residence relocation decisions imply forward-looking decision making. We examine job and residential mobility by means of bivariate models and interpret the outcomes in light of the search model.
INTRODUCTION
The debate among economists on the relationship between residence and workplace relocation is for many years still vivid. Firstly, economic theory is still in a stage of further analytical development, instigated inter alia by new insights acquired in the fields of migration and labor market Ž w x w x research see for example, Linneman and Graves 25 , Zax 54, 56 or Van w x . Ommeren et al. 42, 43, 44 . Secondly, many empirical issues are still unresolved and do lead to inconclusive interpretations. This is likely due to differences in the geographical pattern and the socio-demographic struc-Ž . ture of the various regional or urban economies. Accordingly, various economic theories are needed to explain the relationship between residence, workplace relocation, and commuting which depend explicitly on the geographical structure of the economy. In particular, the distinction between nonoverlapping urban areas, dominant in the United States, and overlapping urban areas, like the Netherlands or the Ruhr area in Germany, is of critical importance here.
It has been strongly argued by geographers and economists alike that the type of relationship between voluntary job-to-job mobility and residential mobility depends on the size of the distance of the moves considered Ž w x w x. by the individual or the household see, e.g., Roseman 31 , Zax 56 . Clearly, a residential move within the same city has different consequences than a move to another city a hundred kilometers away. Recently, for nonoverlapping urban areas, an interesting microeconomic foundation has Ž w x. been offered for this argument Zax 56 . It can, for instance, be shown thatᎏgiven the structure of an urban economyᎏjob and residential moves may act as substitutes given an unexpected change in the commuting costs, in particular when the employer moves the workplace location Ž w x. Ž Zax 54, 56 . This result has been supported by empirical evidence Zax w x w x. 54 , Zax and Kain 55 . In contrast, it has been taken for granted that for Ž . workers who migrate between nonoverlapping urban areas over long distances, there is hardly any meaningful distinction between a job or residential move, as both are envisaged as necessary complements. Consequently, for nonoverlapping urban areas, it seems necessary to distinguish between intra-and interregional moves. Ž For relatively more homogeneous overlapping urban areas and rural . areas , however, a different economic framework is needed which can deal with different types of combinations of workplace and residence locations, Ž . including those in seemingly distinct urban areas. Moreover, in overlapping urban areas which include a set of open labor markets, the distinction between intra-and interregional mobility seems ad hoc and, therefore, less meaningful. First of all, borders between urban areas are difficult to draw as urban areas are not surrounded by rural areas. Secondly, whether a move is ''intraregional'' or ''interregional'' depends on the characteristics of the individual, and therefore has to be explained by economic theory. In the present paper, we will rely on a search theoretic framework that illuminates the link between moves at different geographical scales.
For example, let us focus on the Netherlands. The Dutch labor market consists of distinct though partially overlapping regional labor markets. This structure restricts the use of urban models to understand commuting behavior. A core assumption of urban models is that wage and rent gradients determine the choice of the residence location, and the distance Ž w x w x w x. is therefore optimally chosen White 51 , Wheaton 49 , Zax 54, 56 . However, in the Netherlands, wage gradients have never been empirically identified and are, most likely, minimal. This is probably due to many wage-setting regulations set by the government, the absence of central business districts, and the geographical structure of the Netherlands that consists of many relatively small cities. For example, the commuting time between the centers of the two largest cities in the Netherlands, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, is about one hour. The area between these two cities is, however, not rural and offers many job opportunities. For example, commuters between these cities travel via Den Haag. Furthermore, in the Netherlands, rent gradients are flatter than in other countries. This can be explained by the Dutch geographical structure and the involvement of the Dutch government in the housing market. Firstly, the majority of new house owners and tenants receive subsidies. Secondly, the renting market, which covers the majority of the dwellings in the Netherlands, is subject to Ž w x. a form of price regulation see Van der Schaar 39 . Often, the rent paid is completely determined by the government. Moreover, many properties are owned by housing associations that use waiting lists and do not supply the property to the highest bidder. In conclusion, the use of urban models, which heavily rely on wage and rent gradients would have severe limitations in this context.
In the present paper, we will analyze the relationship between residence and job-to-job mobility. To simplify matters, we use a theory that does not Ž w x. rely on the existence of wage or rent gradients see also Rouwendal 32 . We will choose our starting point in recent developments in the literature Ž which emphasize the importance of residential moving costs see, inter w x w x w x. Ž alia, Zax 54, 56 , Boehm 4 , Ioannides 21 and job moving costs see, w x w x. inter alia, Hughes and McCormick 20 , Van den Berg 37 . Therefore, we will pursue the theoretical analysis by assuming that individuals consider job or residence relocations, while taking into account that residence and job relocations are costly. Furthermore, in contrast to the existing literature on the relationship between job and residential mobility, we acknowledge that individuals may move more than once in the future, and that jobs and residences are accepted, given an appropriate job or residence offer. So, the type of dynamic decision-making we consider here is explicitly dynamic, and fits directly in the nowadays popular search theory. According to this model, workers do not choose the optimal commuting distance by maximizing current utility, due to moving costs and uncertainty about future relocations. In contrast, workers consider whether a job or residential move, which may change the commuting distance, will increase lifetime utility. The search model considered in this paper implies, therefore, types of mobility depend positively on commuting costs. In the present paper, we examine job and residential mobility simultaneously. We assume that the sole link between job and residential mobility are commuting costs. Thus, job and residential mobility are not related, conditional on commuting costs. In other words, a change of workplace that does not change commuting costs has no effect on the probability of moving residence location, and, similarly, a change of residence location that does not change commuting costs has no effect on the probability of moving job location.
Ž . The statistical analysis of simultaneous spatial choices is, however, not w x always straightforward. Zax 56 gives a short overview of different econometric techniques which can handle the simultaneity of workplace and residence relocations. Empirical studies on the interrelationship between residence and workplace relocation based on micro data can be found, w x w x w x inter alia, in Bartel 2 , Linneman and Graves 25 , and Zax 54 and Van w x Ommeren 40 . These studies rely on static discrete choice models, with w x the exception of Van Ommeren et al. 43 who employed duration techw x niques, because of the restricted type of data at hand. Zax's 56 overview paper suggests that bivariate discrete choice models are appropriate if the distinction between intra-and interregional mobility is ignored. 1 However, in general, the natural method to estimate search models is in continuous time. In this paper, we will investigate whether residential and voluntary job-to-job mobility are related by employing a bivariate duration model.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the relationship between job and residential mobility. In Section 3, we will present the specifications of the loglikelihood of the duration model. Next, the empirical results of the duration model are presented based on a sample from the Netherlands. Finally, we offer a concluding section.
THE DEPENDENCE BETWEEN JOB AND RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY
To get a better understanding of the relationship between commuting, job-to-job mobility and residential mobility in a general setting, we will use here a stationary search model as formally developed in Van Ommeren et w x al. 44 . In contrast to the static utility theories, which traditionally have dominated the discussion on the relationship between job and residences, it is assumed that one has to search for jobs and residences. In line with the search literature, it is supposed that jobs and dwellings are offered with a probability which depends on the search effort in the labor and housing markets. The individual has to decide instantly whether or not to Ž . accept a job or residence offer, taking into account the change in commuting costs. The use of search theory seems obvious, since it has been one of the main theoretical and empirical tools to understand Ž w x. transitions in the labor market see Devine and Kiefer 9 . In some cases, search theory can explain empirical facts in commuting behavior which are 1 The notion that intra-and interregional moves are behaviorally distinct imposes difficulties on the estimation procedure. Given appropriate definitions of intra-and interregional Ž w x w x. moves, a nested logit approach might be a practical solution see Evers 12 , Zax 56 . w x hard to explain using static utility theory. For example, Hamilton's 16 results suggest that a random matching model of jobs and workers in urban areas is closer to the reality of urban commuting than the urban w x economic model with decentralized employment. Rouwendal 33 shows that theories which include search by unemployed and employers are able w x to underpin Hamilton's 16 finding that workers are virtually footloose. Although search theory has been less influential in explaining residential mobility behavior, researchers have become increasingly interested in this Ž w x new research endeavor see, e.g., Pickles and Davies 28 or Rouwendal w x.
.
According to the search model developed, behavior on the labor and residence market are related, as every job or residential move might imply a change in the commuting costs. Furthermore, it is assumed that jobs can Ž w x. be characterized by the wage rate see Devine and Kiefer 9 , and Ž w x w x. residences by ''place utility'' see Wolpert 52 or Yapa et al. 53 . The distributions of wages, place utility, and commuting costs are supposed to be known to the worker. So, in essence, workers change jobs because they have found a match which offers a higher wage, while they change residences because they have found a better matchᎏa higher place utility ᎏbetween their demand for dwellings, which is individual specific, and the supply of dwellings. Of course, each combination of dwelling and job location uniquely determines the commuting costs. As it is explicitly assumed that individuals take into account future residential and job moves, our analysis is truly dynamic.
Whether an individual accepts a residence or job offer does not only depend on the direct gain in wage or place utility, but also on the residence and job moving cost. As far as we know, no clear empirical estimates of the level of generalized costs of moving residence are avail-Ž w x able, but the residential moving costs are likely high see Boehm 4 , w x w x w x Weinberg et al. 48 3 . It is noteworthy that in contrast, the results of Van w x den Berg 37 suggest that job turnover costs are low. In the search model considered, we allow explicitly for the costs associated with moving job and residence.
The point of departure in our analysis is that the workers search continuously for better jobs and dwellings, maximizing the discounted future flow of wages, place utilities, minus commuting costs, taking into account the costs of changing jobs and residences. Job and residential moving behavior and commuting behavior are due to a combination of chanceᎏthe arrival of an offerᎏand a decision-making processᎏthe decision to search with a certain intensity and to accept or reject an offer. Thus, search theory implies that, in general, a worker is not able to choose the amount of commuting costs which is optimal, due to the existence of relocation costs and the small probability to get a job or residence offered at any desired commuting distance. Search theory is therefore, for our purpose, an appealing framework as it is based on the idea that individuals accept simultaneously a new combination of a job, residence, and commuting distance taking into account future behavior. In Van Ommeren et al. w x 44 the optimal decision rules can be found, which state which job or residence offer induces a job or a residential move, and which not. 3 Of course, the decision to accept a new job does not only depend on the characteristics of the individual in the labor market, but also on the characteristics of the housing market, while the decisions in the housing market depend also on the characteristics of the individual in the labor market. Consequently, acceptance of a job depends therefore on the level of the residential moving costs and the probability to get a residence offered.
Since no distinction has been made between ''intraregional'' and ''interregional'' moves, the search theoretic framework presented here can Ž . handle different types of job and residence re locations. In particular, nontrivial results can be derived about the relationship between ''intraregional'' and ''interregional'' moves. We will illustrate this by two interesting examples. EXAMPLE 1. According to the search model, a move to another residence in the same neighborhood will occur only if a higher place utility is attained. After the occurrence of the ''intraregional'' move, the probability of an ''interregional'' residential move will decrease, because the willingness to move residence again has declined. Consequently, individuals with higher probabilities of accepting ''interregional'' job offers will, in general, move less ''intraregionally.'' EXAMPLE 2. Consider the situation that an individual is offered a job on an ''interregional'' distance of hundreds of kilometers. According to the search model, if the individual accepts the job offer, then this implies that Ž . almost every residence offer will be accepted with probability one, reducing the long ''commuting distance'' as quickly as possible. However, after the interregional residential move, the probability of moving residence again will likely be higher than before, as the place utility of the dwelling offered first will be, on average, low. This well-known phe-Ž w x. nomenon, called ''repeat migration'' see DaVanzo 8 , can therefore be understood based on simple search theoretic assumptions. With the following two examples, we will make clear that the introduction of search theory sheds also new light on a range of some other aspects of commuting behavior which are hard to explain using static theories. EXAMPLE 3. Search theory recognizes that it takes time to obtain desirable employment or residence positions by means of moving job or residence. So, ceteris paribus, those who are longer in the labor market are more likely to obtain job positions which offer higher wages and less commuting costs. As a result, the model predicts that older workers are more likely to commute less. This theoretical result corresponds indeed to Ž w x. earlier empirical findings see, e.g., Rouwendal and Rietveld 34 .
EXAMPLE 4. In a study on gender differences and commuting behavior, w x Ž . White 50 reports that ''contrary to expectations'' commuting distance depends negatively on the elapsed residence duration. However, this result fits neatly within the search framework proposed. The search model predicts that the probability to move residence falls with commuting costs, so individuals with short commuting distances will be observed with large elapsed durations.
Finally, we turn to two predictions of the search model. Firstly, a prediction of the search model is that job and residential mobility both increase with commuting costs. This result is a consequence of the underlying assumption that commuting is costly. Secondly, job and residential Ž mobility are not related, conditional on commuting costs viz. a change of workplace that does not change commuting costs has no effect on the probability of moving residence location, and, similarly, a change of residence location that does not change commuting costs has no effect on . the probability of moving job location . This result is a good consequence of the assumption that the sole link between job and residential mobility are the commuting costs. In Section 4, both predictions will be empirically analyzed.
THE SPECIFICATION OF THE LOGLIKELIHOOD FOR DURATION OBSERVATIONS

Introduction
The natural method to estimate search models is the use of duration Ž models, also called hazard, continuous time, or failure time models see w x w x. Lancaster 23 , Kalbfleisch and Prentice 22 . To examine the above stated implications of the search model, we have to specify the joint behavior on the labor and housing market in terms of durations. As an alternative, the duration of stay can be seen as the outcome of a sequence of discrete choices over time. One can treat the duration observations as the outcome of T binary outcomes during T periods. A period in which not a move is observed corresponds to a zero, while a move corresponds to a one. This allows for the analysis of durations by means of discrete choice models. It seems natural to analyze discrete data by means of a probit or logit model. However, the parameters and functional form of these models are not Ž w x. 4 invariant to the time unit chosen Flinn and Heckman 13 . If the period chosen is small enough however, the discrete choice and duration model are, in principle, equivalent; however, computationally acceptable specifications are different in practice. For example, the handling of endogenous and unobserved variables is not equivalent. Thus, we will apply bivariate probit and duration models. This gives the opportunity to check whether the results are robust with respect to the chosen specification.
In contrast to static models, dynamic search models make predictions about expected behavior in continuous time: The search model allows one to calculate the expected duration of the current combination of job and residence. Of course, the expected duration depends explicitly on the parameters of the model, viz. the probability that a residence or a job is offered, the distribution of wages, place utilities and commuting costs, the residential and job moving costs, the discount rate and the current value of the wage, place utility, and commuting costs. Using the empirical estimates of job and residential mobility, we will calculate the elasticity of the expected duration of the current combination of residence and job with respect to the commuting distance.
Duration models
In this section, we construct the likelihood for bivariate multiple duration observations sampled from a stock. Hence, we sample a worker at a Ž . certain point of time who is employed and who occupies a residence . So, initially assume that we observe the total length of the job duration t and 1 the residence duration t . T and T are defined as random variables for 2 1 2 which t and t are realizations. Given the stock sampled duration obser- 1 2 vations, one may distinguish between two types of estimation procedures: joint and conditional likelihood procedures. Joint likelihood procedures Ž . estimate the bivariate duration distribution f t , t given the observed 1 2 variation in the durations t and t . Conditional likelihood procedures 1 2 Ž . estimate f t , t given the observed variation in the durations t and t , conditional on the elapsed duration of p and p . We prefer conditional 1 2 likelihood procedures to joint likelihood procedures, as less strong assump-Ž w x. tions are needed about stationarity of the process Ridder 30 . The specification of the likelihood of t and t , given the elapsed durations p and p , will be explained now. Initially, we assume that, at the moment of 2 sampling, we observe employees and their elapsed job and residence Ž . durations no left censoring and we follow these employees over time until they leave the job.
We denote the bivariate distribution of the completed duration variables Ž . t and t as f t , t and the corresponding bivariate cumulative distribu- Thus,
Then, the likelihood of t , t , conditional on the elapsed durations p 1 2 1 and p has the following form:
Ž . Moreover, the joint distribution of t and t , f t , t , depends on the Ž . time-varying observed variables x and on unobserved variables¨and 1 . The variable x includes a range of variables, including the commuting 2 costs, etc. Recall that the theoretical search model assumes that conditional on commuting costs, job and residential mobility are not related. Thus, when we include all observed and unobserved variables in the model, job and residential mobility are not related. In consequence, we assume that the durations t and t are independently distributed, given all 1 2 Ž . observed and unobserved explanatory variables:
Hence, information about the unobserved variable¨cannot improve the 2 statistical description of t , given the information about¨and x. Simi- 1 1 larly, the unobserved variable¨cannot improve the statistical description 1 of t , given the information about¨and x. 6 In other words, the bivariate 2 2 durations are conditionally independently distributed, the condition being the observed and unobserved explanatory variables. Since, by construction, we do not know the values of the unobserved variables, we will see that t 1 and t are related, when¨and¨are related. Thus, in the empirical 
Ž .
1 , be written as
Until now, we have discussed the likelihood in terms of durations. Nevertheless, estimate results are often reported by means of hazard rates Ž . duration models are therefore often called hazard models . The relationship between the duration distribution and hazard rate is unique. The Ž . hazard rate t is defined as the probability of leaving the current state i at time t conditional on being in the current state until t , i s 1, 2. So Ž where ␤ and ␤ are parameters to be estimated a mixed proportional 1 2 w x. hazard model, see Honore 17 . Thus, we assume that the hazard functions do not allow for duration dependency. We exclude duration-dependency for two reasons. Firstly, the theoretical search model is stationary. Secondly, other empirical investigations of job and residential mobility in Ž the Netherlands indicate that duration dependency is absent e.g., Lindew x. 7 boom and Theeuwes 26 . Given the assumptions on the hazard functions, it can be seen that the distribution of T , conditional on¨and x is i i exponential. So,
Moreover, in practice, there appears to be a trade-off between the specification of Ž w x. duration-dependency and the mixing function see Lancaster 23 . When one does not allow for duration-dependency, in the empirical specification, the effect of unobserved variables on the hazard rate are generally more pronounced. Since we will investigate the hypothesis that the unobserved variables affecting job mobility are not related to the unobserved variables affecting residential mobility, we reduce the risk of not rejecting the null hypothesis. and
Ž . Given the choice of a conditional likelihood method, formula 2 may be used as a basis for the empirical analysis. In many cases, t is not observed,
i i
The construction of the loglikelihood for time-stationary explanatory Ž < . variables is simple, as it just requires substitution of f t¨, x and 1 1 Ž < . Ž . f t¨, x , as defined in formula 2 . However, we wish to include time- 2 1 varying explanatory variables, since during the period of observation some explanatory variables change. In our specification, we allow the explana-Ž . tory variables to change annually episode splitting . This can be established by rewriting the densities of the durations as a multiplication of annually sampled observations. The likelihood function L of N households which are observed during M years can then be written as follows Ž . i s 1, . . . , M; j s 1, . . . , N :
Ž . where sam s 1, if individual is sampled in year i, otherwise 0; cen ij s 1,
if the job spell of worker j in year i is right-censored, otherwise 0; Ž . cen ij s 1, if the residence spell of the worker j in year i is right-2 censored. Hence, the loglikelihood of t , t given time-varying hazard rates 1 2 can be rewritten simply as the product of stationary conditional densities w x and survival functions. For further details, we refer to Lancaster 23 .
The choice of the mixing distribution is based on computational and w x theoretical considerations. Lindeboom with probabilities P , P , P , and P , respectively. Thus, The masspoints and probabilities of the discrete mixing function can be estimated. Given the estimated masspoints and probabilities of the mixing Ž function, the correlation between the durations can be calculated see Van w x. 8 den Berg et al. 38 . Adding masspoints hardly changes the results. The model has been estimated using a maximum likelihood procedure of the program Gauss. Since the loglikelihood does not have a unique Ž w x. maximum see Lancaster 23 , we have estimated the model several times with different starting values for the coefficients ␤. It appeared that the model generated identical solutions for different sets of starting values. Hence, we can safely assume that the coefficients ␤ reported here maximize the likelihood function.
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
Ž . The data set used here called Telepanel , collected in 1992᎐1993, includes the complete life cycle pattern of Dutch respondents, including the labor, residential, and family career. The data were collected in a retrospective way. Of this data set, males were sampled who worked on the first of January of one of the years between 1985 and 1991. At the moment of sampling, the elapsed job and residence duration was asked. Workers are followed over time either until they leave the current job or until December 1991. In the case that a worker leaves the job before December 1991, he may be re-sampled at the first of January of one of the following years. So, we follow these workers for a maximum of seven years. Furthermore, we restrict the sample to those who work more than 20 hours and for whom all relevant data were observed. This leaves us with 372 observations. On average, persons are observed for 6.3 years. The focus on males separate from females seems sensible, as labor market behavior differs strongly between males and females, which manifests itself in differences Ž w x. in their commuting behavior see, e,g., White 50 .
We must emphasize here that the data set is not a random sample from the workforce. The respondents received a computer at home for free and 8 w x Van den Berg et al. 38 also report that the use of more masspoints hardly changes the results. The results are essentially the same when adding more masspoints, since the added masspoints occur with probability close to zero. For example, when¨has three points of 1 support then the estimated probability corresponding to the third point of support is less than 1rN, whereas N is the number of observations. Hence, in practical terms, the added masspoints occur with probability zero.
were then required to answer a large number of questions on a range of topics using a specially designed computer program. This sample proce-Ž dure oversamples, therefore, persons who are computer literate and who . have, for example, higher educational levels . It is unlikely however, that this sample procedure affects our empirical results substantially.
The data set allows us to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary job moves due to firing. Precise information about commuting distance and commuting time is missing in our data set, as only the municipality of residence and workplace of the worker is available. We approximate commuting costs by the variable logarithm of the distance between the centers of the municipalities plus one. 9 The mean commuting distance is 20 kilometers. About 40% of the persons work in the same municipality as they live. For these persons, we have fixed the commuting distance equal to zero. 10 We include here as relevant explanatory variables those suggested by economic theory. Our choice of the explanatory variables to characterize the differences in job and residential mobility is discussed below.
Job mobility
Ž Job-to-job mobility is defined as a¨oluntary change of employer which . may or may not change the workplace location . Job-to-job mobility probably tends to increase with higher educational achievement, because higher education offers more opportunities to grow and more variation in wages. Thus, education is thought to be a form of investment which increases the return on the hours worked and offers more opportunities Ž . 11 for an upward career vertical job mobility . The following five levels of education are included in our model: university education, polytechnic education, vocational education, low vocational education, and high school. The individuals having only primary school are in the reference group. 9 We take the logarithm of the distance, since the marginal effect of the distance on the commuting costs will be lower when commuting distances increase. We add one, to avoid problems with commuting distances which are equal to zero. Analyses with a linear function of commuting distance give very similar results. 10 To test whether this way of measuring commuting distance affects our results, we have reestimated the model including a dummy for those who work in the same municipality as they live. This dummy appears to be insignificant. However, as anticipated, the coefficients of commuting distance indicate then a stronger relationship between commuting distance and mobility then reported in the current paper. 11 Horizontal job mobility decreases with education according to the dual labor market Ž w x w x. theory Doeringer and Piore 10 , Mekkelholt 27 . For example, lower educated individuals operate more frequently in a market with temporal contracts than higher educated people. However, horizontal mobility is frequently involuntary, and workers with temporal contracts have higher probabilities of becoming unemployed.
Not only formal education, but also on-the-job experience and personal skills determine the level of relevant skills for a job. The level of skills of an individual is reflected in the position within the firm, which influences job mobility in a similar way as formal education. In addition, hiring and firing costs will depend on the position of the employee within the firm, which will affect job mobility. Two different levels of positions are incorporated in the model: one group consists of employees with one, two or three subordinates, the other group consists of employees with at least four subordinates. The reference group consists of employees without subordinates.
It is often argued that age has an effect on the probability to leave a job, because young people are more willing to move, as they have more opportunities to grow. We have included a dummy for respondents younger than 24, for those between 24 and 34, and for those between 34 and 44; older persons are in the reference group. It is well-known that job turnover strongly fluctuates over the business cycle. For example, in the Netherlands, during the sixties job mobility was high, while at the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties, turnover turned out to be extremely low. Instead of including a measure for the business cycle, we included dummies for groups of calendar years, which offers more flexibility. The reference year is 1991.
The type of employer likely influences job mobility. Therefore, we included dummies for the size of the branch, whether employed in the building sector, 12 whether employed by the government, and a dummy for those on payroll. Clearly, a high wage rate reduces the probability to leave Ž . a job voluntarily, and hence we included the logarithm of the hourly wage. Finally, we included a dummy for jobs with more than 32 hours.
Residential mobility
A residential move will be observed, if the gain in place utility of the Ž move is higher than the discounted moving costs taking into account . future moves . One may expect that some variables influence particularly Ž . the direct place utility of a residence in particular commuting distance , Ž while others will more likely influence the moving costs e.g., the presence . of children, tenure of dwelling . Clearly, the place utility attached by the inhabitant to the dwelling depends on characteristics which change over Ž w x. time see Linneman and Graves 25 .
It is well-known that residential mobility strongly depends on the stage in the life cycle. In general, younger people experience more moves.
According to the search model, this is due to a combination of lower residential moving costs, more opportunities to get a better residence offer, and higher corresponding job mobility rates. Moreover, younger people experience more changes due to marriage and divorce. We have included a dummy for respondents younger than 24, between 26 and 34, and between 34 and 44. Persons above 44 are in the reference group.
The residential moving costs depend strongly on the size of the dwelling, and so we included a dummy for those who occupy houses which are not Ž . shared with others than members of the household ''complete house'' , and for those who have less than 4 rooms. It goes without saying that the markets for rented and owned residences differ strongly. For the renters higher mobility rates are expected as the moving costs are lower. We have included a dummy for owners. The presence of children probably increases the cost of moving, and therefore decreases the probability to move, and therefore we have included a dummy for children at home. Moreover, we suppose that the moving rates are different for those who live with their parents, with their spouse or alone.
The supply side of the Dutch housing market is extremely regulated: in the Netherlands, 95% of all rented residences are subject to a form of Ž price regulation, while 75% of all new houses are subsidized Van der w x. Schaar 39 . The regulations outlined by the government do favor particular groups, which clearly effects the mobility behavior of those groups. In particular, lower incomes receive housing allowance and generally have to queue for a residence, while higher incomes operate more in the private sector, which is more flexible. Thus, residence offer rates are likely lower for low income groups. So, we include a dummy for hourly wage. Finally, we have included dummies for calendar years, with 1991 as reference year.
In the Appendix, descriptive data can be found. Since we deal with a group of individuals that we follow over time, we have given the values at the moment they are observed for the first time.
Empirical estimates
As a point of departure, we have separately analyzed job and residential mobility. As the outcomes of the parameters of the univariate and bivariate models are very similar, we present and discuss only the estimates of the bivariate model.
The empirical results can be found in Table 1 . The results indicate that there is no statistically significant sign of dependence between job and residence mobility. 13 The correlation between the job and residence dura- 13 We also tested for correlation by regressing the generalized residuals of job mobility on the generalized residuals of residential mobility, which showed a positive, but insignificant w x relationship. For a discussion on generalized residuals, see Lancaster 23 . tion is only 0.03, whereas the standard error is 0.20. Thus, the statistical and economic significance of the dependence between job and residential mobility is extremely low. As a consequence, we cannot reject the hypothesis that voluntary job-to-job and residential mobility are independent, conditional on commuting costs and a range of other explanatory variables. Thus, the empirical results support the theoretical framework. Let us focus now on the estimates of the masspoints and the corresponding probabilities. The estimates show that only a small proportion of the employees move more often than the other employees due to factors that are not explicitly included in the model. About 3% of the individuals Ž . P q P s 0.03 have a masspoint of 5.58, whereas the others have a mass 2 4 point of 4.13. This implies that 3% of the individuals have a job hazard Ž . rate that is 35% higher 5.58r4.13 s 1.35 . Similarly, about 1% of the Ž . individuals P q P s 0.01 , have a masspoint of 0.12, whereas the others 3 4 have a masspoint of 0.03. Thus, 1% of the individuals are about 4 times more likely to move residence.
Our empirical results further suggest that a job in the public sector, educational level, wage rate, commuting distance, tenure, working full-time, and the calendar year affect significantly voluntary job-to-job mobility. In accordance with search theory, young persons and higher educated persons are more mobile, because they have more opportunities to grow. The fact that persons working in the public sector are less mobile can be due to Ž several hypothetical factors, which all point in the same direction e.g., . more job security, loss of pension funds . Moreover, we find that the wage rate influences negatively job mobility. Part-time workers have higher job mobility rates, confirming ''that men do not, as a rule, regard these jobs as Ž w x. permanent'' Pissarides and Wadsworth 29 . Job mobility decreases with the size of the employer. This is usually attributed to the fact that large employers offer higher levels of non-wage compensation. All these results seem to correspond to our current knowledge of the labor market.
The effects of age on job mobility deviate from most other job mobility studies. This suggests that employees between 34 and 44 move more often, whereas it is normally found that job mobility decreases with age. Employees with a few subordinates move less jobs than those without subordinates or with more than three subordinates. It may be that employees with a few subordinates have more opportunities for an upward career and will remain shorter in their current job. At last, the estimates of the calendar years reflect the known aggregate fluctuations in job mobility in the Netherlands. In the mid eighties, job mobility was extremely low in the Ž w x. Netherlands see Mekkelholt 27 .
Finally, it appears that commuting distance positively influences job Ž mobility. We calculated that the elasticity of the expected job duration in . Ž . years with respect to commuting distance in kilometers is approximately y0.15. So, as a rule of thumb, an increase of 10 kilometers in commuting distance reduces the expected job duration by approximately one and a half years.
Also the results for the residential mobility are plausible. All signs point at the expected direction. Young persons move more frequently than older persons, while also the type of the house has a money influence: owners move less, while persons who share kitchen or shower move more. We do not find any effect whether the individual lives with his parents. Those who Ž live with a spouse move substantially less the effect is, however, not . significant at the 5% level . The effects for educational level are as expected; however, the wage level appears to be insignificant. The effect found for the calendar years corresponds also nicely to the aggregate Ž fluctuations in residential mobility in the Netherlands although the effects . are not statistically significant here . At the end of the eighties, residential Ž w x. mobility is relatively high see CBS 17 . It appears that commuting distance positively influences residential mobility. The elasticity of the Ž . expected residence duration in years with respect to commuting distance Ž . in kilometers is almost y0.10. So, a similar rule of thumb as applied for job mobility can be used: an increase of 10 kilometers in commuting distance reduces the expected residence duration by approximately one year.
The elasticity of the expected duration of the current combination of job and residence location is estimated to be approximately y0.25, so an increase of 10 kilometers in commuting distance reduces the expected duration of the current job and residence by more than two years.
The current empirical specification relies on the assumption that housing characteristics affect only residence mobility, and that job characteristics affect only job mobility. However, according to the search model, the explanatory variables should be the same. Therefore, we have reestimated the univariate models including the full range of explanatory variables. It appears that none of the residential characteristics affects job mobility and Ž none of the job mobility characteristics affects residence mobility estimaw x. tion results are given in Van Ommeren et al. 42 .
We have assumed that the commuting distance affects mobility, in line w x with the search model. Linneman and Graves 25 hypothesize, however, that changes in characteristics affect residential and job mobility. We have therefore reestimated the model including a regressor which measures the Ž change in the commuting distance during the previous year ignoring the . data during the year when this change is unknown . The effect of this regressor appears to be small and statistically insignificant. Furthermore, we have reestimated the model including regressor which indicates whether the commuting distance has increased, stayed the same or has decreased during the previous year. This regressor affects job mobility positively, but the coefficient is only significant at the 10% significance level. The effect of this regressor on residential mobility was negligible. Given these specifications, the effect of the level of commuting distance was positive and significant. In conclusion, it appears that the level of the commuting distance, but not so much the change in the commuting distance, affect job and residential mobility. This result is in line with the search model presented.
We have compared the results of the bivariate duration model with those from a bivariate discrete choice model employing the panel structure Ž w x.
14 of the data see Hsiao 19 . The results were very similar. In the context of the current paper, it is important to report that the latter model confirms that, firstly, job and residential mobility are unrelated, conditional on commuting costs, and that, secondly, job and residential mobility are increasing in commuting costs. Finally, we have estimated the duration model using more than four masspoints. It appeared that the results were almost identical, since the Ž . added masspoints occurred with probability close to zero. See, also, footnote 8. Thus, we conclude that our results are robust with respect to the chosen specification.
Structural estimates
According to search theory, while job and residence relocations are both a result from a lifetime utility maximization process, neither is a direct determinant of the other. Rather, they both respond to opportunities and changes in the housing and labor markets. If the explanatory variables do a good job of describing moving processes, there would not be any residual relationship between job and residence relocations.
Thus, we added the predicted probability of moving job within a year as a regressor in the specification of residential moving. We found that the estimates of the original regressors hardly change, while a likelihood ratio test with a value 0.2 indicates no causation. 15 Similarly, we added the predicted value of the probability to move residence as a regressor in the Ž . specification of moving job. The value of a likelihood ratio test 0.2 showed this effect to be highly insignificant. In conclusion, we do not find Ž any evidence that job and residential moves are mutually related condi-. 16 tional on the regressors used . 14 The results can be obtained from the first author upon request. 15 This test is only valid if the estimate of the coefficient of the added regressor is consistent. 16 We estimated also a structural simultaneous probit model, by using the predicted value of a job move as a regressor in the equation for a residential move and the other way round Ž w x. see Zax 54 . It appears that job moves do not influence residential mobility and residential moves do not influence job mobility.
In line with the theoretical search model, the hypothesis that the Ž . probability to move job residence influences the probability to move Ž . residence job is rejected. However, there might be a good reason why our model does not reject the independence hypothesis even when it does not hold. Statistical models do not predict very well residential or job mobility. The regressors which correspond to the predicted probability of moving job or residential are poor approximations. Thus, we examine the independence hypothesis under stronger assumptions, which might eliminate this scepticism.
Stronger assumptions about causality: job mo¨es trigger residential mo¨es?
In many theoretical and empirical studies where job and residential moving behavior is analyzed, a sequential ordering of the decision to move residence or to change jobs is implicitly assumed: individuals search either for jobs given their residence 17 or individuals search for a new residence given the workplace location. 18 The search framework introduced earlier allows for simultaneous search on the housing and job market and thus embodies theories that rely on a sequential ordering. Thus, these models assume that either the probability of receiving a job offer or the probability of receiving a residence offer is equal to zero. These assumptions seem implausibly restrictive.
Let us now make the reasonable assumption that the probability of receiving a job offer is much smaller than the probability of receiving a residence offer. It can be seen then that it is rational for the individual first to move a job and then to move residence. This occurs because after a job move that increases commuting costs, the probability that the commuting costs can be reduced by moving residence is high. However, given a residential move that increases commuting costs, the probability of reducing the commuting costs by moving a job is small within a reasonable period. There are sound theoretical reasons to expect thatᎏunconditional on commuting costsᎏjob moves trigger residential moves, but not the other way around. In principle, the search model predicts that conditional on commuting costs this effect disappears, but it allows us to treat the observed job moves as if they were exogenous, addressing the criticism stated above that the predicted job move is not a good predictor of observed job moves. To test this result, we included a dummy of obser¨ed job moves as an exogenous regressor to explain residential mobility. It was found that the additional regressor was positive, but not significant at the Ž 5% level using a t test or a likelihood ratio test the coefficient equals . 0.26; standard error equals 0.14 . We may conclude that job moves do not strongly trigger residential moves, again, this result is in line with the research model that supposes that job mobility and residential mobility are related via commuting costs.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have argued in this paper that the relationship between job-to-job and residential mobility depends on the geographical structure of the economy. We started from a search model which assumes that workers search simultaneously on the labor and housing market, while taking into account commuting costs as well as moving costs and that they move more than once in the future. We have illustrated that such a search model is useful to understand commuting behavior and the relationship between intraregional and interregional moves.
A prediction of the search model is that job and residential mobility increase with commuting distance. We examined this result by employing a bivariate duration model. Our results show that an increase of 10 kilometers in commuting distance reduces the expected duration of the stay in the same job and residence with more than two years.
Another prediction of the search model is that job and residential mobility are unrelated, conditional on commuting costs. The statistical analysis did not reject this prediction. The correlation between job and residence durations is statistically insignificant, and equal to only 0.03. Thus, it appears that the empirical analysis is consistent with the theoretical search model. 
APPENDIX
